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Abstract – Public spaces such as airports, railway stations or stadiums bring together large numbers of people 
on a quite limited space to use a security-sensitive infrastructure. Electronic security systems may help to 
provide better and faster security, as well as safety for the general public. Application scenarios may include 
intrusion detection and monitoring of large crowds in order to provide guidance in case of unexpected events 
(e.g., a mass panic). However, current security systems used within the public infrastructure are typically 
expensive, non-trivial to deploy, difficult to operate and maintain, prone to malfunction due to individual 
component failures, and generally lack citizen privacy-friendliness. The advent of novel, large-scale distributed 
security systems based on wireless, lightweight sensors may enhance security and safety in public spaces. In this 
realm, SAFEST is a project aiming at analyzing the social context of area surveillance and developing a system 
that can fulfill this task, both in terms of technology as well as acceptance by the general public. The targeted 
system will operate in a distributed way, collect anonymized data, securely transfer this data to a central 
location for evaluation, and – if necessary – notify the operator or issue alerts directly to the general public. 
Work on the technical aspects of the system is accompanied by social studies investigating the individual 
perception of risk and the methods for reaching public acceptance of the technical solutions. 
  
1. Introduction 
In public spaces with integrated infrastructure support, 
civil security refers to the following two distinct items: 
First, the general population must be protected from the 
dangers of unexpected events (e.g., a fire). Such events – 
independently of whether they are caused intentionally or 
accidentally – typically lead to irrational behavior of the 
affected persons. In crowded places, this may result in a 
mass panic, thus multiplying the danger posed by the 
initial threat. Second, critical infrastructure (e.g., an 
airport) must be protected against unauthorized access. 
Unauthorized access to a critical infrastructure may result 
in damage or sabotage, both of which undermine security 
and thus endanger the general public. The direct protection 
of the population as well as the protection of critical 
infrastructure can both be ensured through a combination 
of observation of the environment, processing of security-
relevant events, and (semi-)automatic initiation of 
appropriate reactions to avert or contain the crisis. 
The successful implementation of civil security is bound 
to social and technical conditions. In this paper, we 
consider technology as a tool to enable enhanced civil 
security under social constraints. This paper describes 
SAFEST, a project aiming to provide a comprehensive 
solution to ensure the safety and security of the general 
public and critical infrastructures. Specifically, SAFEST 
addresses the problems of intrusion detection and crowd 
control by the means of socio-cultural analysis and a 
distributed system for sensing and alerting. This 
interdisciplinary approach is one of the key strengths of 
this project. 
The technical goal of SAFEST is to design a system that 
is equally suited for the protection of critical 
infrastructures and for the protection of individuals in large 
crowds. Critical infrastructures will be protected through 
the detection of illegal access; persons in crowded 
environments will be protected through intelligent crowd 
guidance, thus mitigating the risk of a mass panic. The 
dual application of this system – which uses largely the 
same hardware components for both application scenarios 
– is interesting for end-users since it effectively lowers the 
investment required to ensure an adequate protection. In 
contrast to video surveillance systems, our approach 
preserves the privacy of citizens since we do not rely on 
technology that is capable of identifying individual 
persons. Additionally, our system incorporates automatic 
event detection and alerting technology to ensure rapid 
dissemination of critical information, may it be to security 
staff or directly to the general public in the affected area 
via cellular phones or PDAs. 
The approach followed by the SAFEST consortium is 
thus holistic in two ways: Scientifically, it is holistic in that 
it considers both the social as well as the technical 
dimensions of area surveillance, intrusion detection, and 
crowd control. Method-wise, it is holistic in that it closes 
the entire processing loop related to ensuring public safety: 
distributed sensing, secure communication, complex event 
processing, and targeted alerting. These properties set 
SAFEST apart from other, more focused approaches, e.g., 
FluSs1. 
The relevance of the results of the SAFEST project will 
be measured through continuous feedback from the public 
safety community actors such as the research forum on 
public safety and security (FÖS) and from end-users such 
as FBS2. Applicability will be verified by the means of a 
demonstrator deployed at the Berlin Brandenburg 
International (BBI) airport. This setting is particularly 
adequate since airports present a very challenging and 
diverse use case with the highest security requirements: 
operational challenges include the protection of 
passengers, staff, and critical infrastructure from serious 
risks such as criminal or terrorist activities in a busy, 
crowded environment. Given these properties of the 
selected use case, it is well conceivable that the SAFEST 
approach will be equally applicable to similar scenarios 
such as railway stations or stadiums in the future.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates on 
the context and describes the major social and economic 
issues. Section 3 gives the outline of the technical 
approach. Section 4 describes the related work in different 
areas. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and presents 
some of our future work.  
                                                            
1  http://www.flughafensicherungssystem.de/  
2  Flughafen  Berlin  Schönefeld  GmbH  (FBS)  
 
2. Context, Social and Economic Issues 
 
The global market for security systems, excluding IT 
security is expanding with potential for considerable 
growth. Today the global market for security sensors 
exceeds 500 M€ and the share of autonomous sensors, 
comprising unattended ground sensor systems (UGSS) and 
wireless sensor networks (WSN), is expected to grow 
rapidly after an industrial development phase. 
Ensuring public safety by the means of access and 
crowd control is however challenging given the right to 
freedom of assembly in most public spaces. The 
effectiveness and public acceptance of security measures in 
these spaces is thus mainly a question of the security 
culture, i.e. the collective understanding by members and 
organizations of a society which events should be declared 
as a risk and how to face them. In particular, area 
surveillance is prone to significant subjective criteria in 
perceiving risks and threats: the population evaluates 
dangers and risks in public spaces by criteria which may 
not reflect the objective situation [1]. People neither can 
assess the exposure of public spaces (e.g., airports or 
railway stations), nor evaluate reasonable preventive 
measures (e.g., new monitoring technologies). 
The set of diverse opinions of citizens is of major 
importance in the public sector, because the dichotomy 
between objectively increased security and subjective loss 
of freedom is highly pronounced. As a consequence, 
efforts towards increased civil security need not only to 
provide system and technology concepts as well as 
appropriate tools, but also to answer the following two 
questions: 
 
1. Which frictions between security and freedom can 
be identified and how are they assessed by 
different sections of the population? 
 
2. Which is the relation between the fulfillment of 
subjective security desires and the objective threat 
estimates by experts, including their suggestions 
of how to cope with identified threats? 
 
 
The subjective perception of risks has been analyzed 
from different scientific perspectives [2][3][4][5]. A 
fundamental result is the observation that there exists 
usually a significant gap between the subjective perception 
and the objective reduction of the security due to risks. 
People are not able to objectively evaluate the real degree 
of security in macroscopic situations, nor are they able to 
evaluate appropriate preventive actions. Nevertheless, 
people form an opinion about threat scenarios and define 
expectations how to deal with anticipated risks. Surveying 
this set of opinions is part of the SAFEST project. The 
more fundamental problem in this field is that of an 
acceptable trade-off, i.e., which degree of freedom people 
are willing to give up in favor of increased security. As this 
problem is being addressed, it results in a dilemma as there 
are positive as well as negative rationales for both 
perspectives: Freedom as well as safety should be 
guaranteed. 
The outcome of the socio-scientific study conducted in 
this project will provide a basis to discuss how much 
security is reasonable and needed for a society, and which 
perspective the population has in this context. Security is 
an utmost subjective construct. This subjectivity within the 
perspective of the population as well as objective insights 
into risks and dangers must guide basic principles of 
political strategies and technological innovations. 
 
3. Technical Approach Outline  
 
The SAFEST consortium gathers academics and 
industrial partners with backgrounds in a variety of 
appropriate fields including secure mobile communication, 
scalable data communications, sensing and data fusion, 
complex event processing, warning and response systems, 
both on the hardware and software aspects. 
In order to address the problem of securing public and 
security-sensitive spaces, SAFEST proposes to apply 
current research from the ICT domain that is conducted 
under the term Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT is 
envisioned consisting of a huge number of embedded 
devices, which will be able to communicate with each 
other over the Internet. With the advent of the IoT, 
physical and virtual objects will communicate with people 
and with each other to accomplish the applications that 
combine information and data sets of the physical world 
with those from the virtual world. This technology is 
ideally suited for creating highly reliable monitoring 
systems that are capable of exceeding the current level of 
protection for public spaces and critical infrastructures. 
 
Current technical approaches to securing public and 
security-sensitive spaces have several shortcomings, 
including the ones listed below. 
 
• They produce huge amounts of data, which cannot 
be processed automatically. In the case of video 
surveillance system, the sheer volume of video 
material, which ideally should be monitored in 
real-time, causes humans in charge of evaluating 
this material to be easily overwhelmed. This 
results in security-relevant incidents not being 
recognized as such in due time, i.e., false negative 
detections reduce the accuracy of the monitoring 
system. 
 
• Current technology also excessively relies on 
video data to protect public/private spaces. 
Depending on the characteristics of the area, other 
data sources may in fact be more suitable to 
identify certain kinds of threats. In particular, 
intruders or crowd movement are only detectable 
via visual inspection to a certain degree. Other 
types of sensor provide a more suitable method of 
detection in closed and confined spaces. 
Additionally, extensive deployments of video 
surveillance systems have acceptance problems 
due to privacy concerns. 
 
 
• The underlying network is not considered even 
though it is used to connect monitoring equipment 
and is vital for the basic distribution of 
monitoring data. Decentralized, multi-hop 
communication systems that provide resilience in 
large-scale deployments, however, induce new 
security risks. They rely upon adaptive routing 
and end-to-end security, both of which are non-
trivial to implement and deploy correctly. 
 
SAFEST thus proposes to develop the required 
technical capabilities to enable rapid and inexpensive 
deployments of embedded sensing devices and to securely 
access the data. Our system will employ technologies 
comprising unattended ground sensor systems (UGSS) and 
wireless sensor networks (WSN) on-site to gather security 
relevant data. Individual nodes in these remotely deployed 
networks will be accessible over the Internet using 
IPv4/v6. The collected data will be transmitted securely 
over existing Internet connections for central monitoring 
by designated entities. Furthermore, we also plan to 
support remote administration and access control of the 
remotely deployed devices. As a result, a deployed IoT-
based system with appropriately equipped sensing devices 
will be able to provide relevant data. The observed data 
will be centrally evaluated by an alerting and response 
system, which consolidates observations and extracts 
context-specific events. Based on the events, notification 
messages will be created and delivered to people on-site. 
Considering the use-case of crowd control, persons may be 
guided to leave a building securely using on-demand 
information transmitted to their cellular phone or PDA. 
In particular, SAFEST’s goal is to define a platform 
meeting the particular requirements of monitoring human 
movement and contribute to the threat assessment model. 
On top of this, SAFEST also aims at providing a reliable 
multi-hop communication mechanism that is required for 
covering large areas. SAFEST will then aim at providing a 
mechanism establishing end-to-end security between the 
participating devices. Based upon this platform, SAFEST 
will aim at providing a mechanism detecting security-
relevant situations, e.g., intruders and dangerous crowd 
density and movement, as well as a scheme to aggregate 
extracted information in order to alert and guide potentially 
affected individuals based on geo information. SAFEST 
will also provide video compression solutions that allow 
for additional visual inspection of the reported events, as 
well as mobile video software client for the guidance 
system. The overall architecture of the system envisioned 
by the SAFEST project is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
4. Related Work 
 
This section reviews related work in various fields in 
the realm of security and safety systems in public spaces, 
such as individual risks assessment, secure wireless sensor 
networks for public security, complex event processing 
and knowledge fusion, dependable and embedded 
networking. 
4.1.1 Secure Wireless Sensor Networks for Public 
Security 
Some recent projects have focused on the usage of 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) or Wireless Sensor and 
Actuator Networks (WSANs) for safety critical 
applications. The UbiSecSens project – “Ubiquitous 
Sensing and Security for the European Homeland” [6] 
focused on developing a purely software-based lightweight 
security toolbox to configure restricted devices with 
respect to various security objectives derived from 
concrete applications. The WSAN4CIP project –  
“Wireless Sensor and Actuator Networks for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection” [7] focuses on secured and 
reliable sensor network technology used in two use cases: 
protecting as well as controlling water distribution systems 
on one hand, and providing continuous health monitoring 
of power plants on the other hand. The overall WSAN4CIP 
objectives were to enhance the reliability of critical 
infrastructures by providing surveillance data for the 
management of the CI to increase the dependability of 
critical infrastructures security, by providing self-healing 
and dependability modules for the WSAN. Another similar 
effort is the BSI project Trusted Sensor Node (TSN) [8] 
the focus of which was on building a trustworthy sensor 
node being applied as a bridge between simple sensor 
nodes and the base-station. The trusted sensor node is 
equipped with hardware accelerators for cryptographic 
methods like AES, ECC and SHA1. 
4.1.2 Individual Risks Assessment 
 
 Criteria for the evaluation of risks and threats do not 
follow rational aspects with respect to stochastic risk 
analysis. Usually, they are based on subjective functioning 
heuristics, e.g., availability heuristics: As soon as potential 
threats are conceivable (e.g., a mass panic), they will be 
assumed as more likely, simply because they are already 
known. In addition, anchoring and adjustment heuristics 
are common: In case of limited data about a threat, 
minimal information will be ranked as quite important 
[28]. Current results show that the population evaluates 
risks based on these self-defined and weighted heuristics. 
These heuristics do not conform to objective criteria. In the 
long run, the perception pattern is based on cultural 
conditions, i.e., the set of existing action patterns that 
suggest how members of a society (should) react to risks 
and threats. However, if all people form their opinion 
based on these criteria, different perceptions of the “same” 
uncertainty arise [5]. 
4.1.3 Complex Event Processing and Knowledge 
Fusion 
Complex Event Processing (CEP) has received 
increasing attention in the past decade, mostly due to the 
availability of data, for instance coming from sensors. CEP 
targets various use cases, ranging from application-related 
event definition to data capturing at the sensor level. In this 
context, SAFEST considers an approach close to the 
Event-Condition-Action (ECA) paradigm, according to 
which an action can be the fact of alerting specific groups 
from the general public. Focus is thus put on the following 
three aspects of CEP: situation recognition, event 
correlation, and alerting. Recognizing situations is an 
essential component of such systems. Situations are 
modeled as a multi-dimensional context that is associated 
with an entity and that is valid during a time interval. The 
entity can be of any type including an individual or a group 
of individuals. Situation recognition relies on attribute 
fusion as described for instance in [9]. 
Event correlation is another relevant technique for 
extracting events of interests in a mass of available events. 
Employing techniques related to data mining, it has been in 
use in telecommunications and IT service management for 
decades. In sensor-based systems, event correlation 
received attention only recently and many evaluation 
engines are now available on the market from major 
vendors. While some work has been carried out on 
situation modeling and algebras in general [19] and on 
Figure  1:  Architectural  overview  
handling ontologies for situations [20], to the best of our 
knowledge, the identification of relevant situations for the 
entities at stake in intrusion detection and crowd control 
has not been addressed until now, mostly for reasons of 
confidentiality. 
In the field of alerting [22, 23], recent work has focused 
on the implementation of multi-channel alerting systems in 
order to increase reliability and reduce the vulnerability of 
the systems. Recently developed multi-hazard alerting 
systems can be used flexibly for a plethora of alerting 
situations, thus allowing the exploitation of synergies as 
well as economies of scale. Most recent trends in alerting 
target the end-user as an individual and try to increase 
usability and alert compliance through increased 
personalization and contextualization [21].  
4.1.4 Dependable, Embedded Networking 
Wireless sensor networking is a key element of the 
Internet of Things (IoT), a substantial part of the billions of 
smart objects that are soon to blend into the global IP 
network, from actuators to home appliances, from smart 
meters, to smart dust. Sensor nodes are devices used for 
distributed and automated monitoring of various 
parameters such as temperature, movement, noise or 
radioactivity levels etc. Sensors are scattered with 
minimum planning with respect to their precise physical 
position (including the central role of the sink, if any), and 
the set of peers with which a sensor can directly 
communicate through its wireless interface may change 
rapidly over time due to asynchronous sleep mode 
strategies, fluctuations in the radio environment, device 
failure or mobility. Through its wireless interface, a sensor 
thus connects to a communication link with undetermined 
connectivity properties [24, 25]. 
Sensor networks are a challenge to current IP standards, 
since on the one hand these protocols were designed to 
work on wired links and on the other hand these protocols 
were designed to work on machines that do not have 
drastic constraints in terms of CPU, power capacities, and 
memory, as sensor nodes do. In consequence, several key 
standard protocols (including TCP, UDP, DHCP, NDP, 
SLAAC, and OSPF) do not function correctly in this 
environment. Nevertheless, IPv6-based sensor networking 
is a viable long term goal because it would enable generic, 
large scale, seamless integration of millions of sensing 
devices using heterogeneous radio technologies, at a low 
cost, and in a future-proof manner. 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is currently 
engaged into multiple efforts addressing the limitations of 
existing standards concerning wireless sensor IP 
networking. Some of the standards under construction [10, 
11] aim at fitting IP formats, especially IPv6 formats, to 
direct wireless communications using low power radio 
technologies such as IEEE 802.15.4, which require IP 
format compression. Other standards in development [26, 
27, 12-16], aim at providing multi-hop wireless sensor 
communication with IPv6, which requires specific routing 
protocols. Yet another family of IETF standards under 
construction focuses on self-management protocols [25], 
[17, 18] that enable sensors to auto-configure their IP 
addresses, network prefixes, and security checks so that 
routing protocols and higher layer applications can 
function correctly [29]. 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
The SAFEST project aims at providing a 
comprehensive solution to ensure the safety and security of 
the general public and critical infrastructures in public 
spaces. Specifically, SAFEST addresses the problems of 
intrusion detection and crowd control by the means of a 
socio-cultural analysis and distributed system for sensing 
and alerting, hence leveraging the wireless sensor 
networking and the Internet of Things. This paper gave an 
overview of its main features. The interdisciplinary 
approach taken here is a cornerstone of this project – the 
kick off of which is planned in Spring 2012. 
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